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PREDICTORS OF TRUST IN BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS: A 
CONTEXTUAL AND CULTURAL COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND 
TURKEY 
 
Trust is a dimension of buyer-supplier relations being researched widely, but studies have generally 
focused on developed economies. Developing countries, however, have contextual and cultural 
factors that may differentiate them from developed countries. This study attempts to apply a 
theoretical model developed for the US, Japan, and Korea to a developing country context, namely 
Turkey. While Turkey has cultural similarities to Japan in terms of collectivism and risk aversion, the 
results of the theoretical model show that is does not fit the Turkish case. Suggestions are made to 
extend the model theoretically and measurement-wise to help explain trust building factors in 
developing countries. 




The development of trust between two parties in an  exchange seems to be a critical point being 
emphasized within the broader framework of buyer-supplier relations, as reflected by proliferation of 
recent literature expanding the concept of interpersonal trust to the domain of interorganizational 
relations (for example, Blois, 1999; Das and Teng, 1998; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Doney, Cannon 
and Mullen, 1998; Hagen and Choe, 1998; Ring, 1997; Sako and Helper, 1998). Most of the present 
literature on trust in buyer-supplier relations has been based on American or Japanese firms and has 
often contrasted the institutionalized forms of trust relationships in Japan with the explicit contracts 
in the U.S. (Choi, Lee and Kim, 1999). However, k nowledge gained in one country does not 
necessarily work effectively in another, primarily because of the role of the contextual variables in 
determining organizational functioning and effectiveness (Wasti, S. A., 1998). Due to factors such as 
cultural differences, the history of extant relations, the contractual framework, and economic and/or 
political instability, buyer-supplier relations are expected to develop differently in different country 
contexts. Increasingly, researchers and practitioners have pointed out to the necessity of utilizing 
socio-cultural features of the given society for overall organizational effectiveness (e.g., Erez and 
Earley, 1993).  
 
Even though it is becoming more common to see research o n governing and facilitating 
business exchanges and on trust in supplier relations in geographical areas or firms of nationalities 
other than the U.S. and Japan (e.g.,  Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Morris and 
Imrie, 1992), little research has been carried out in developing countries (Choi, Lee and Kim, 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz. 1998). What has been less understood are the patterns of institutional and 
organizational mechanisms and processes that have emerged in the absence of strong legal regimes 
(Choi, Lee and Kim, 1999). Where contracts cannot be enforced, firms have to build up personalised 
trust relationships to sustain even simple transactions, so the absence of an effective legal system 
compounds the problem of creating trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). Economic transactions and 
institutional configurations are significantly influenced by trust relationships in developing countries, 
where organizations faced with environmental uncertainty and complexity may prefer, or actively 
seek to design, a governance structure that could try to develop a partner-specific trust (Choi, Lee and 
Kim, 1999).  Since raising competitiveness in d eveloping countries requires rebuilding inter-firm 
relations,  the manner in which effective cooperation can be achieved in highly uncertain business 
environments as those typified by emerging economies needs to be understood (Humphrey and 
Schmitz. 1998). This brings about the need to investigate the issue of trust using country-specific data 
if the socio-cultural aspects of the country do not match the nations already studied. As businesses 
grow beyond national borders, studies that involve examining how antecedents of trust between 
exchange partners differ across different contextual elements should prove useful to managers (Choi, 
Lee and Kim, 1999; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Doney, Cannon and Mullen, 1998).    4
 
As a recent example to studies on trust in buyer-supplier relations, Dyer and Chu (2000) have 
developed a model of buyer-supplier trust that holds in the US, Japan, and Korea. Since Dyer and 
Chu have applied their model to two countries that are considered to have collectivistic cultures in 
their study, it would be expected that the model would also apply to other collectivistic cultures such 
as Turkey. Japanese and Turkish scores on Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions regarding collectivism 
show Turkey and Japan have only a 9-point difference. Similarly, Turkey’ s and Japan’s uncertainty 
avoidance scales are also almost the same (a 7-point difference). However, the level of development 
may also be a contextual factor that needs to be taken into account since trust cannot be easily 
designated as a cultural, as opposed to an economic, phenomenon. Hence it will be useful to test this 
model on a country like Turkey, which has similarities to Japan in terms of cultural dimensions, but is 
at an earlier developmental stage economically.  
 
This study will focus on the Turkish automotive sector, not only because it is the third largest 
sector in Turkey, but because a large number of findings on the U.S. and Japanese automotive 
industries allow for comparisons as well. The Dyer and Chu (2000) study mentioned above also takes 
the automotive industries in the US, Japan, and Korea as its domain, enhancing the opportunity of 
comparative discussion. Furthermore, while studies such as Gules et al. (1997) and Wasti, S. N. 
(1998) have provided detailed background information on the buyer-supplier relations in the Turkish 
auto industry, the factors affecting these relations, and the development of trust between exchange 
partners in particular, have not been investigated. The purpose of this study is to use questionnaire 
data from 106 Turkish supplier firms in order to identify determinants of  trust in  buyer-supplier 
relations in the rapidly expanding Turkish automotive industry and, wherever possible, to compare 
results with findings from developed countries. This study will use the model developed by Dyer and 
Chu as its baseline and determine its fit with the Turkish case, and suggest possible changes to make 
the model more suitable to a developing country context.  
 
 
THE TURKISH CONTEXT AND THE EVOLUTION OF BUYER-SUPPLIER 
RELATIONS IN THE TURKISH AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY1 
 
 
Turkey is an example of a developing country, considered to be one of the big emerging 
markets for global business (Jennings, 1996)—one of less than a dozen countries that, despite 
constant change and occasional instability, are expected to account for the overwhelming 
incremental growth in world imports (Garten, 1996). According to Garten (1996), Turkey will play a 
                                                                   
1 The historical descriptions in this section are based on the detailed descriptions provided by Azcanli (1995) and Gules et 
al. (1997).   5
pivotal role in the future, for it is both the link and the buffer between Europe and the Middle East and 
the southern tier of the former Soviet Union. Hence, it is at the border between the developed and 
developing worlds, on the front line of the dynamic exchanges that will define the nature of the 21
st 
century. Garten (1996) also notes that in recent years an economic renaissance has made the Istanbul 
stock market one of the most attractive in the world. Despite having entered a period of difficulties, 
Turkey has managed to recently undertake serious economic reforms, which include an accelerated 
privatization  program, eased foreign investment restrictions, and reduced import charges/fees. 
Foreign companies are investing in Turkey as part of their global expansion strategy rather than to 
sell outdated technology (Gules, Burgess, and Lynch, 1997). The case of Turkey is also  of special 
interest because of its unique cultural and historical factors. Since the establishment of the republic in 
1923, Turkey can said to be in transition from a rural, agricultural, traditional, patriarchal society to a 
modern, industrialized, urbanized and egalitarian one;  a newly industrializing country with the 
society holding both traditional and modern values side by side (Wasti, S. A., 1998). 
 
Given that trust is not strictly an economic phenomenon and is tied strongly to socio-cultural 
factors, the same model of determinants may not hold in each country (Sako and Helper, 1998), so it 
is likely that a difference will be observed for the Turkish case. In a very broad sense, Turkish 
sensitivities are more likely to show agreement with Japanese responses because both are generally 
collectivist, family-oriented societies with proud traditions. On Hofstede’s dimensions, the Turkish 
culture is described as collectivistic, risk averse (uncertainty avoiding), feminine, and having high 
power distance (Hofstede, 1980).  While being particularly close to Japan on the dimensions of 
uncertainty avoidance and collectivism, Turkey occupies an in-between level on cultural dimensions 
when compared to the U.S. and Japan, which perhaps makes it harder to derive directly relevant 
lessons from the literature on either country. Furthermore, although many nations including Turkey 
are defined to be collectivist, it is only in Japan where the collectivism of Japanese culture has been 
carried over to the companies (Tayeb, 1994). According to Triandis (1995), collectivists differentiate 
ingroup and outgroup members very clearly, and treat the latter very harshly in case of conflict. In 
Turkey, the dominant ingroup is the family and Turkish social life involves interaction with family 
members to a great extent (Bradburn, 1963). This is in contrast to the Japanese case. As argued by 
Kashima and Callan (1994), although the family or household (ie) represents an accurate metaphor 
for the Japanese organization, the Japanese household structure is different than that of a typical kin 
collectivist culture as it allows the expansion of the family structure beyond immediate relatives to 
non-kin employees. Kashima and Callan (1994) argue that in the Japanese family system, households 
may form a larger grouping (dozoku) when a branch household (bunke) is established by giving it a 
portion of the family assets. The establishment of a bunke does not need to be through kinship. On the 
contrary, Turkish people have difficulty trusting and cooperating with people outside blood relations 
(TUSIAD, 1991). Hence, while the risk aversion scores of the Japanese and Turks are quite close, the 
differences in the concept of “ingroup” may make trust formation towards the buyer more difficult in 
Turkey than in Japan.   6
 







Turkey   92  95  46  54 
Japan  85  45  37  66 
United States  46  62  91  40 
Table 1.  Scores of Turkey, Japan and the United States on Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions.   
 
Other contextual variables could also affect the determinants of trust. Extant research on 
enforcement of agreements has contrasted institutionalized forms of trust relationships in Japan with 
the explicit legal contracts in the U.S. However, international business transactions involving 
developing regions of the world are characterized by uncertain environments where neither contracts 
nor trust-type enforcement mechanisms may be effective (Choi, Lee and Kim, 1999). Hence, this 
study will take the Dyer and Chu (2000) model as its baseline model and will test how well it fits the 
Turkish case, given the contextual factors noted above.  
 
  The first automotive assembly operation in Turkey began in 1929 through a government 
supported agreement bet ween Turkish entrepreneurs and Ford Motor Company. However, due to the 
international economic circumstances preceding World War II, production in this Istanbul plant 
quickly decreased and production ceased soon after 1934. The second attempt to create an 
automotive industry was in 1954, when a company called Turk Willys-Owerland Ltd. Partnership 
was formed to produce jeeps for the army. This factory continued production till 1970 after which it 
was bought out by the Ministry of Defense. Later came the formation of the Federal Turkish Trucks 
Factory (later renamed as TOE-Turkish Automotive Industries Ltd.) in 1954 in Gebze, and the start 
up of Otosan in 1959 (an alliance with Turkish partner Koc Trading Co. and Ford Motor Co.), the 
latter producing Ford Thames trucks and Ford Consul passenger cars. The first Turkish prototype 
automobile, Devrim, was produced in 1961 in Eskisehir, but this prototype was never developed into 
a mass production form. The first mass produced car, Anadol, based on a design by British Reliant, 
was built by Otosan in 1966, and its production continued until 1984. 
 
  From 1954-1980, a period during which an import substitution strategy was adopted, local 
content was encouraged and protection from foreign competition was observed. This pr ompted 
foreign automakers to either produce locally through joint ventures, or to quit the Turkish market. 
The foreign manufacturers opted for the former, and companies such as Fiat S.p.A. Torino Group and 
Renault began production in 1971 with local partners in Bursa. On the other hand, the stringent 
technology transfer and licensing agreements with these foreign firms prevented the newly formed 
alliances from being competitive in the global market. Although overcapacity existed in the 
automotive sector by  1964, new investments were supported, which resulted in the assemblers 
producing most of their components in-house. Due to the large number of models, economies of scale 
could not be reached and the local suppliers could not fully develop themselves. With the limitations   7
on imports, local suppliers also lacked the drive to enhance quality. The local automakers, noting that 
they would not be able to expand their markets beyond the nation’s borders and that they had to use a 
certain quantity of local components, opted to take advantage of the protected market and 
emphasized price over quality when outsourcing (Nedimoglu, 1997). Within this policy, suppliers 
were not expected to develop new products and the buyers’ main goal was to have alternative 
suppliers. The scarcity of local suppliers stimulated assemblers to provide technical and financial 
support to build their own supplier base. With the profit levels satisfactory in the market, the 
automakers were not prompted to develop new products even when not constrained by their 
licensors.  
 
  In the 1980s, the import substitution strategy was replaced with an export oriented one, which 
removed quotas of local contents and enabled assemblers to look overseas for better suppliers. To 
maintain their cost competitiveness, assemblers put a great deal of pressure on their suppliers and 
played them off against each other. The increased usage of Advanced Manufacturing Technologies 
(AMTs) by the assemblers increased their requirements from the suppliers in the areas of quality, 
delivery, and flexibility. 
 
  Beginning with Opel in 1989 and Toyota in 1990, the government allowed new foreign 
investments. Tax rates on imported vehicles were also reduced during 1990s, forcing assemblers to 
compete head on with overseas competition. Local assemblers were forced to increase variety and 
quality. Further, under the Customs Union agreement with the European Community, Turkey agreed 
to adopt the standardization, measurement, accreditation, test, and certification legislation of the 
Community over a period of 5 years. Meanwhile, investment permissions were given to Honda and 
Hyundai in 1993, to Mazda in 1996, and to Kia and Daewoo for future years. These permissions 
initiated the production of models that did not have a local supplier base in Turkey. Automakers 
preferred to import from multinational supplier firms that could reach economies of scale and thus 
have lower prices. Local suppliers were pushed towards exporting their products and also getting 
quality certifications required in the European market. In the late 1990s, the relationships reached 
into a quasi-collaborative stage, where assemblers reduced their number of direct suppliers and 
suppliers were being encouraged to build partnerships (particularly with foreign component 
suppliers) to attain economic production scales, the latest technology, and higher quality. While 
assemblers often retained the option of importing parts, suppliers were also reluctant to get locked 
into a relationship with a particular buyer due to the demand volatility and economic circumstances. 
The level of technical support, while focusing on meeting the assemblers’ demands, was relatively 
higher than before. Due to the increased integration with the global economy, it is expected that the 
collaborative arrangements between buyers and suppliers will increase in number and depth in the 
upcoming years.  
 
Turkey’s joining the European Customs Union in 1996 has had the impact of more stringent   8
quality requirements in any industrial product exported to Europe. This factor has acted as an impetus 
for Turkish manufacturers to study Japanese methods to reach the higher quality standards and 
implement quality control processes. Efforts at getting ISO 9000-9001 certifications have turned into 
an institutionalized norm. Even though the transplanting of Japanese manufacturing practices is one 
factor behind the change in more collaborative buyer-supplier relations (Gules, Burgess, and Lynch, 
1997), the effects of Toyota and Honda’s entrance are yet to be fully observed. At this point, the 
production volumes of these Japanese joint venture firms are still quite low compared to their Turkish 
competitors (for an overview of the players in the Turkish automotive industry, see Appendix). 
However, interviews with ToyotaSA’s (Toyota’s joint venture with the Turkish giant, Sabanci 
Holding) top management have demonstrated ToyotaSA’s eagerness to enhance relations with the 







  This section will first briefly explain the hypotheses in Dyer and Chu’s cross-national study 
on buyer-supplier trust. The hypotheses developed in their study will be supplemented with 
arguments geared towards adapting their study to the Turkish context where appropriate. 
 
Using arguments from the trust literature, Dyer and Chu (2000) expect that higher levels of trust 
will emerge in exchange relationships where the transactors have a long history of interacting. The 
development of trust  implies an investment in the time dimension of relationships (Ring, 1997). 
Along the same lines, one can say that trust evolves through the process of a growth of knowledge 
and understanding of the people with whom we interact plus the actual experience of working with 
them  (Blois, 1999). More specifically, trust is most likely to be the accumulation of prior satisfactory 
experiences (Das and Teng, 1998; Sako and Helper, 1998). The experience of the trading relationship 
indicates the underlying trustworthiness of potential partners and a deep ening of trust involves a 
learning process (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). According to Doney and Cannon (1997), the length 
of time represents an investment both parties make in the relationship and the process of prediction 
can also be invoked as a relationship grows older. When exchange relationships have a history, the 
outcomes of previous business episodes provide a framework for subsequent interaction. With 
increased experience, firms are more likely to have successfully weathered critical shake-out periods 
in their relationship and gained a greater understanding of each other’s idiosyncrasies (Doney and 
Cannon, 1997). We posit that the following will also hold for the Turkish case: 
Hypothesis 1: The supplier’ s trust in the buyer is positively associated with the length of the 
relationship. 
   9
  Dyer and Chu (2000) argue that face-to-face communication increases supplier-buyer trust 
by (1) facilitating the development of personal ties, thereby increasing the efficacy of social sanctions, 
and (2) providing superior information to assist transactors in detecting trading partners that are the 
untrustworthy “type.” Subcontracting in Japan, a collectivistic culture like Turkey, goes beyond such 
mechanisms and is also relational, drawing on face-to-face relations to help enforce minimally 
specified contracts (Hagen and Choe, 1998). Das and Teng (1998) also argue that communication and 
proactive information exchange form yet another tactic to boost trust among partners. Firms need to 
collect evidence about their partners’ credibility and trustworthiness, and communication facilitates 
this process. Furthermore, communication helps build trust because it provides the basis for 
continued interaction from which partners further develop common values and norms. The first item 
in Dyer and Chu’s statement above may be particularly relevant for the Turkish case, since in a 
traditional society like Turkey having close personal relationships is a common way to do business 
(Gudum and Kavas, 1996) and Turkish suppliers seem to have quite long relationships (an average of 
over slightly over 12 years) with their main customer (Wasti, 1998). Therefore we can state the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2:  The supplier’ s trust in the buyer is positively associated with the extent of 
face-to-face communication bet ween the two parties. 
 
  A concept related to the length of the relationship is the anticipation of its continuity. Dyer 
and Chu (2000) make the argument that a buyer’s willingness to stay with the same supplier is likely 
to be interpreted by the supplier as a signal of commitment and trustworthiness. Along the same lines, 
the authors expect frequent competitive switching of suppliers to be associated with low trust. Based 
on  the concept of the “shadow of the future” regarding the long-term commitment into the future, 
Sako and Helper (1998) posit that the longer the informal commitment made by the customer to 
continue trading with the supplier, the higher is the supplier’s trust for its customer. Furthermore, 
Hofstede (1980) implies that in uncertainty-avoiding cultures such as Turkey, stability would be 
prized higher than other forms of material gain. These arguments can also be tested as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The supplier’ s trust in the buyer is positively associated with the track record of 
continuous repeated exchange with the buyer. 
 
  The basis for the development of trust is partially in the hands of the partners and particularly 
in the hands of the dominant partner (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). In the Japanese context, the 
willingness of large manufacturers to  help subcontractors solve various operational problems has 
encouraged subcontractors to respond in a trusting manner (Dyer and Chu, 2000; Hagen and Choe, 
1998). According to Das and Teng (1998), trust is earned from partners if one adapts to the needs of 
cooperation in partnerships. Specifically, flexibility and the willingness to accommodate deviations 
from the contract when necessary are key to interfirm adaptation. Sako and Helper (1998) argue that 
in the automotive industry, the buyer typically has greater power in relation to its suppliers, and 
therefore the weaker partner is more grateful for technical assistance from its buyer. Sako and Helper  10
(1998) find that technical assistance from the buyer is significant in enhancing trust in Japan (a 
collectivistic culture) and not in the US (an individualistic culture). Dyer and Chu (2000) argue that 
the automaker’s offer of assistance is considered a signal of goodwill and commitment because it 
suggests the automaker is genuinely concerned. The above arguments seem relevant for Turkey (a 
collectivistic culture) as well, as almost 63% of suppliers stated that they entered their current line of 
business with support and guidance from their main customer (Wasti, S. N., 1998) 
Hypothesis 4:  The supplier’ s trust in the buyer is positively associated with the extent of 
assistance provided by the buyer. 
 
  One of  the trust building practices mentioned in the Japanese business is the 
cross-shareholding between buyers and suppliers in the vertical keiretsu (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). 
Creation of mutual commitments through hostage exchange overcomes the weaknesses of implicit 
trust, reputation, or ethics in highly uncertain and unpredictable environments (Choi, Lee and Kim, 
1999), which is typically the case in developing countries. The customer’s ownership of its suppliers 
may be interpreted by the latter as a form of credible commitment for long-term relationship (Sako 
and Helper, 1998). The results from descriptive data on Turkish suppliers indicate that such a 
governance mechanism does not seem to be widespread in Turkey (Wasti, S. N., 1998). Almost 99% 
of Turkish suppliers state that they are not wholly-owned subsidiaries of their main customer, and 
about 97% state that their main customer do not own stock in their company. While a positive 
relationship was hypothesized in the Dyer and Chu (2000) model, we do not expect stock ownership 
to be a significant variable for the Turkish case under present circumstances. 
Hypothesis 5: The supplier’ s trust in the buyer has no association with the extent of supplier 
stock owned by the buyer. 
 
  Though related to the issue of continued repeated exchange in Hypothesis 3 but not included 
in Dyer and Chu’s model is the issue of supplier switching costs; how easily a customer can switch 
from one supplier to another. A signal for commitment a buyer can display is to increase its 
dependence on the supplier. Sako and Helper (1998) argue that the more difficult it is for the buyer to 
swich away from the supplier, the greater the supplier’s trust in its buyer. A bilateral relation that 
involves investment in specific assets cannot be maintained unless the parties in the relation are 
effectively protected from each other’s opportunism by certain arrangements, such as each party 
making specialized investments of value only to their joint business (Hagen and Choe, 1998). A 
buyer may buy a greater portion of its needs from one buyer (moving single to sole sourcing) or 
implement technologies that necessitate closer links between the exchange partners. Such actions 
will give the supplier a relation-specific skill, and hence increase the switching cost of the buyer. The 
more alliance-specific the investments, the more risk there is for partner firms (Das and Teng, 1998), 
so a buyer undertaking such cooperative purchasing strategies may be said to be increasing its 
switching costs. Burgess and Gules (1998) argue that the rise in TQM, JIT, and related concepts have 
resulted in a shift towards cooperative purchasing strategies. Such soft technologies are demanding  11
in their implementation, requiring the strong support of suppliers. Based on data on the Turkish 
automotive industry, Burgess and Gules (1998) found support to their hypothesis that soft technology 
implementation contributed more to explaining variations in buyer-supplier collaboration. 
Furthermore, as stated above, the Turkish culture is identified as being uncertainty avoiding 
(Hofstede, 1980), hence: 
Hypothesis 6:  The supplier’s trust in the buyer is positively associated with the extent the 







  A preliminary questionnaire was developed in 1997 and presented for comments to numerous 
officials from automotive companies, both buyers and suppliers, and automotive associations by way 
of interviews that each lasted an average of 1.5 hours. With the feedback received in the pretests, a 
self-administered mail questionnaire was designed and sent to over 300 Turkish automotive parts 
suppliers. The results presented in this paper are based on 106 responses received by March 31st, 
1998, resulting in a response rate of approximately 30%. Given that this was a lengthy and detailed 
questionnaire of 10 pages, the response rate comes across as reasonable
2. The public guides that were 
used to construct the mailing list did not provide additional information about the suppliers listed, 
hence a comparison of early and late respondents was done on key variables to test for nonresponse 
bias. Since the questionnaire asks quite a few questions about supplier views and obstacles regarding 
product development, it is possible that the responses might show a bias towards technologically 
superior suppliers who have some background and capability in product or process innovations and 
who were not alienated by such questions.  
 
Among the items relevant to the study most had less than 10% missing, two had between 
10-20%, and two had 22.6% missing. Means substitutions can be used for low missing data ratios 
(less than 10-15%) and for uncorrelated (r= 0.2-0.3 or lower) data (Beale and Little, 1975; Heitjan, 
1997; Roth, 1994), which was the case for this dataset. For the remaining respondents, missing values 
were imputed for scales using a missing data imputation procedure called “two-way imputation” 
(Bernaards & Sijtsma, 2000) where both the person mean and the item mean was used  to impute data
3. 
Where this was not a feasible approach, regression imputation (Buck, 1960; Little, 1988; Roth, 1994; 
                                                                   
2 As an example, another study on the nature of trust between buyers and sellers by Doney and Cannon (1997) has a 31% 
response rate. 
3 The formula used was: (item mean + person mean for the scale - mean of item means on answered items). This formula 
was applied on a scale-by-scale basis to impute missing values.  12
Switzer III, Roth and Switzer, 1998) was utilized to supplement the data available.  
 
Testing the Dyer and Chu baseline model 
  This study takes the Dyer and Chu (2000) model for supplier-automaker relations as a 
baseline model to compare the Turkish case to results from developed countries. Dyer and Chu’s 
model has been applied to the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and hence its appropriateness (or lack thereof) 
for the Turkish case can provide interesting cross-country insights, particularly considering the fact 
that both Japan, Korea, and Turkey are considered collectivistic cultures (Hofstede, 1980). Simply 
stated, their model can be shown as: 
 
TRUST= a+ b 1 LENGTH + b 2 FACE + b 3 CONTINUITY + b4 ASSISTANCE + b 5 STOCK 
where TRUST is operationalized as the sum of the following submeasures: 
1. The extent to which the supplier trusts the manufacturer to treat the supplier fairly. 
2. The extent to which the automaker has a reputation for trustworthiness (following through on 
promises and commitments) in the general supplier community
4 
3. If given the chance, the extent to which the supplier perceives that the automaker will take 
unfair advantage of the supplier (reverse scored). 
 
In Dyer and Chu’s model, LENGTH is operationalized as the number of years since the supplier 
first began selling products to the automaker, and FACE is the annual “man-days” that the supplier 
and automaker spent in face-to-face contact during the past year. CONTINUITY is operationalized 
as the percentage of time the supplier’s business had been renewed when there was a model change 
and STOCK is the percent of supplier stock owned by the automaker. ASSISTANCE is measured by 
the following three items: 
1. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier improve 
product quality. 
2. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier reduce 
                                                                   
4 According to Blois (1999), given the costs and difficulties of creating a ‘water tight’ contract, it can be attractive to deal 
with a firm which has a reputation for being a good customer since one has confidence that regardless of the contract they 
will be anxious to treat their suppliers fairly. Blois states that a reputation is the result of the organization’s past behaviour 
and will provide information on how the organization has previously dealt with contingencies. Also according to Das and 
Teng (1998), locating a partner with a good reputation seems to be an effective starting point. A firm with a reputation of 
being honest, fair and trustworthy gives the other party the first piece of evidence to take some initial risk. In Japan, for 
instance, since subcontractors maintain long term relations with large assemblers, they have considerable info about large 
assemblers’ policies and welfare. Any unfair action by large manufacturers toward them would be discovered easily 
quickly disseminated through the dense web of interfirm and interpersonal relations. The cost of such negative reputation 
could be high as suppliers would be reluctant to take part in long-term trade relations with such an opportunistic company 
by investing in transaction-specific assets and skills (Hagen, James M., Soonkyoo Choe. 1998).  13
manufacturing costs. 
3. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier improve 
inventory management/delivery. 
 
  The available data on the Turkish automotive industry provides for the testing of the above 
model with highly similar, if not the same, operationalizations. A trust measure was formed using the 
Turkish data based on the following three items, to be answered keeping the supplier’s main 
customer in mind and measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “None” to “Very Much”: 
1.Does your main customer have a market reputation as being trustworthy and fair? 
2.Is your main customer fair towards you? 
3.If your main customer asked you to make a customer-specific investment without a written 
contract, how willing would your company be? 
The Cronbach alpha for this construct was 0.72.  
 
  The measures for LENGTH and STOCK were the same in the Turkish data as the Dyer and 
Chu study. CONTINUITY was measured on slightly different terms. Since model changes in the 
Turkish automotive industry are not as frequent a s in the developed world, the question that was 
deemed more relevant was as follows: 
  “When a new model of your main customer is out and you get the business of producing your 
component for it, does your company continue selling the component to your customer during 
the entire production cycle of the new model?  Yes/No.” 
 
FACE was measured by a similar measure, based on a scale ranging from 0: “Never” to 5:“Daily”
5: 
  “How frequently do your engineers and technical employees exchange information regarding 
the design of your component with your main customer via face-to-face meetings?” 
 
  ASSISTANCE was measured in a broader way than in Dyer and Chu’s model. 
ASSISTANCE1 is similar to Dyer and Chu’s operationalization, based on the following two items on 
a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1: “No” to 3: “Maybe” to 5:”Yes”: 
  “If you do not satisfy your main customer with your production (in terms of delivery date or 
performance), what do you think the result would be:  
1. Our main customer would financially assist us in investing in more appropriate equipment 
2. Our main customer would provide us with technical assistance (e.g. training) in identifying 
and solving problems.” 
This construct had a Cronbach alpha value of 0.67.  
 
  According to Ring (1997), trust is enhan ced by actions that occur over and above the strict 
                                                                   
5 1: “Annually”, 2: “Quarterly”, 3: “Monthly”, 4: “Weekly.”  14
observance of norms, rules, and contracts. Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) also found that flexibility 
outside the contract (e.g., being ready to help in an emergency, being prepared to give and take and 
being willing to overlook occasional faults) was associated with trust, particularly in their British 
sample. While it was not included in Dyer and Chu’s operationalization, we felt such a variable 
would help in explaining further variance in our dependent variable. Hence we decided to expand the 
definitions of “assistance” to delve into the nuances of its meaning for suppliers. To capture this 
concept, ASSISTANCE2 is was devised as a more specific   measure, trying to get at the types of 
assistance that would  normally be above and beyond the call of duty. We asked the following 
question, measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1: “Not at all” to 3: “A little” to 5:”Very 
much”: 
  “Does your main customer provide assistance such as buying extra components, giving you 
new business, reimbursing you for stocks not purchased in case of a component change, etc.” 
 
  ASSISTANCE3 is  another extension to Dyer and Chu’s baseline operationalization. It is 
based on the historical accounts of the Turkish automotive industry and information collected during 
the pretest interviews and may be somewhat peculiar to certain nations (e.g., Japan). Gules, Burgess 
and Lynch (1997) have observed that the elapsed stages of the automotive industry development in 
Turkey follows almost the same pattern as Lamming’s four-stage model for more developed 
economies. What differs is the first half of the first phase, which arises from the special conditions of 
the early years of the Turkish automotive industry. During the initial stages of industry development, 
the scarcity of local suppliers and the obligation of assemblers to increase the use of domestically 
produced components stimulated assemblers to provide financial and technical support to build their 
own supplier base. This stage, where risk sharing was high among exchange partners, is named as the 
“supportive phase” of buyer-supplier relations in the automotive industry (Gules, Burgess, and 
Lynch, 1997). In order to test if the support of buyers to the suppliers in their stage of “liability of 
newness” aids in the generation of trust, we asked the suppliers the following question: 
  “Did your company commence the production of your main component with the guidance 
and support of your main customer? Yes/No.” 
 
  SWITCHING is measured in a multifaceted way. SWITCHING1 attempts to understand the 
extent to which the buyer has utilized cooperative purchasing strategies as described by Burgess and 
Gules (1998) that may increase its switching costs. The suppliers were asked the following question: 
  “Does your company deliver its products to its main customer Just-in-Time? Yes/No.” 
 
SWITCHING2 asks the supplier what percentage of main customer’s needs for the product 
on hand was bought from their company in recent years, while SWITCHING3 tries to g et at the 
switching threats the buyer utilizes towards the supplier. SWITCHING3 is formed by the following 
items, measured by a 5-point scale ranging from ‘1: Not at all’ to ‘5: Very much’: 
1.  Does your main customer use other domestic suppliers as an ace up its sleeve?  15
2.  Does your main customer use foreign suppliers as an ace up its sleeve? 
3.  Does your main customer switch to another supplier right before purchasing starts despite 
first working closely with your company? 
This construct had a Cronbach alpha value of 0.62.  
 
  In the Turkish automotive industry, as in many other auto industries, the suppliers are 
typically smaller than the buyers. According to Hagen and Choe (1998), small firms have few 
safeguards6. Hence size (as measured by the number of employees) was included in  this study as a 
control variable. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the Turkish sample. The data was found to 
be not multicollinear. 
 
                                                                   
6 Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) give an example where the risks of opportunistic behavior from their buyer, a large 
Indian electric company, were greater for the suppliers, many of whom were small.  16
  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Trust (3 items, alpha: 0.72)       
Does your main customer have a market reputation as being 
trustworthy and fair? a 
4.3  1.0  98 
Is your main customer fair towards you? a  3.9  1.0  99 
If your main customer asked you to make a customer-specific 









Length of relationship (years)  12.4   7.5  104 
Face: “How frequently do your engineers and technical employees 
exchange information regarding the design of your component with 








Continuity : “ When a new model of your main customer is out and 
you get the business of producing your component for it, does your 
company continue selling the component to your customer during the 
entire production cycle of the new model?”







Stock (% owned by buyer)  1.81  11.5  99 
Assistance1 (2 items, alpha: 0.67)       
“If you do not satisfy your main customer with your production (in 
terms of delivery date or performance), what do you think the result 
would be
c: 
     








Our main customer would provide us with technical assistance (e.g. 







Assistance2: “Does your main customer provide assistance such as 
buying extra components, giving you new business, reimbursing you 








Assistance3: “Did your company commence the production of your 
main component with the guidance a nd support of your main 
customer?”
 (% answering Yes) 
 
61.5 
   
104 
Switching1: “Does your company deliver its products to its main 
customer JIT?”
 (% answering Yes) 
 
49.5 
   
104 
Switching2: Percent of main customer’s needs for the product on hand 
that was bought from supplier in recent years 
82.8  24.7  93 
Switching3 (3 items, alpha: 0.62)       
“Does your main customer use other domestic suppliers as an ace up 
its sleeve?
 a  
3.1  1.4  97 
Does your main customer use foreign suppliers as an ace up its sleeve?
 
a 
3.1  1.5  97 
Does your main customer move to another supplier at the purchasing 









Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the Turkish sample. 
a On a scale from 1: ‘Not at all’ to 3: ‘Somewhat’ to 5:’Very much’. 
b On a scale from ‘0: None’ to ‘5: Daily.’ 






  Initially, the Dyer and Chu baseline model was run for the Turkish data. The results are given 
below (Table 3), together with the results found by Dyer and Chu for the U.S., Japan, and Korea: 
 
  Hypothesis 
number and 
expected sign in 
Dyer and Chu 
(2000) 
Turkey  U.S.  Japan  Korea  
Length   H1 +  -0.001  -0.02  0.25***  -0.10 
Face  H2 +  0.059  -0.09  0.08  -0.02 
Continuity  H3 +  -0.576  0.53***  0.05  0.21*** 
Assistance  H4 +  0.255***  0.04  0.34***  0.35*** 
Stock  H5 +  0.010  0.04  -0.02  -0.07 
R
2    0.17  0.26  0.12  0.20 
Adjusted 
R2 
  0.11  0.23  0.08  0.18 
N    82  135  101  217 
F-value    3.094**  9.1***  3.7**  10.7*** 
Table 3. Standardized coefficients for the baseline model by Dyer and Chu (2000).  The control 
variable of size was insignificant. 
* p< 0.1 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
 
  As can bee seen from the above table, Dyer and Chu’s model seems to fit other collectivistic 
cultures’ samples better than it fits the Turkish sample in terms of factors found significant. In Japan, 
the length of the relationship and assistance received from the customer are found to be significant. In 
Korea, expectations of repeated exchange and assistance r eceived from the customer are the 
significant variables (the US sample is similar to the Korean one in the first variable). In the Turkish 
case, the only significant variable is the one common to the data from other collectivistic cultures; 
namely, assistance received from the customer. In all three countries, this variable is highly 
significant. Due to its significance, it seems that further investigation into the concept of assistance 
would prove insightful.  
 
Extensions to Dyer and Chu’s Baseline Model 
  Dyer and Chu’s baseline model helps test most of the hypotheses listed in the previous 
sections of this paper for the case of Turkey. However, it can clearly be seen that the model has less 
explanatory power for the Turkish sample than for the developed country samples. Firstly, it was  18
noted from the descriptive statistics that in the Turkish sample the variables STOCK and 
CONTINUITY did not display much variation7. It seems clear that stock ownership is not a widely 
used governance mechanism in the Turkish automotive sector. Both variables turned out to be 
insignificant in the baseline model, so it seemed unnecessary to include them in further analyses. 
Secondly, since it was highly significant in the Japanese, Korean, and Turkish samples, the definition 
of the concept of ASSISTANCE was expanded as described above to include more types of help 
from the buyer (ASSISTANCE1, ASSISTANCE2, ASSISTANCE3), and SWITCHING was added 
with 3 facets (SWITCHING1, SWITCHING2, SWITCHING3) to expand the baseline model. The 
results of the expanded model are given in Table 4. 
 
  Hypothesis number 





Length   H1 +  -0.015 
Face  H2 +  0.007 
Assistance1  H4a +  0.251*** 
Assistance2  H4b +  0.104 
Assistance3  H4c +  -0.470** 
Switching1  H6a +  0.393** 
Switching2  H6b +  -0.007* 
Switching3  H6c -  -0.167** 
Intercept    4.196*** 
R




  0.268 
N    82 
F-value    4.716*** 
Table 4.  Results of the expanded model. 
* p< 0.1 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
 
  It is clear from Table 4 that the expanded model has substantially more explanatory power for 
the Turkish sample than Dyer and Chu’s baseline model, both in terms of variance explained and in 
terms of significance of factors. The regression model explains over a third of the variance and most 
of the variables are found to be significant. In this model both ASSISTANCE1 and ASSISTANCE3 
are significant, while all three forms of SWITCHING are significant at differing degrees. 
SWITCHING1 and SWITCHING3 are significant in the predicted directions, while SWITCHING2 
is significant in the opposite direction to what was predicted. ASSISTANCE2 does not turn out to be 
                                                                   
7 100 responses were received for CONTINUITY, 97 of which were answered as Yes and 3 as NO.  Likewise, for the 
questions measuring STOCK and percent of stock ownership were answered by 101 and 98 respondents respectively. For 
STOCK, only one respondent answered Yes, and the mean of percent stock ownership was 1.81%.  19
significant. Hence the variables newly added to the baseline model have provided a better picture of 
the Turkish case. It is seen that suppliers receiving financial and technical help from their customers 
feel more trust towards their buyer. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that suppliers who have 
entered their line of business with support and guidance from their main customer feel less trust. As 
predicted, suppliers who deliver their products to their customers Just-in-Time and those who 
provide a larger portion of their main customer’s needs feel more trust towards their main customer. 
Furthermore, the more the main customer gives the impression that it may switch to another supplier, 







Dyer and Chu’s baseline model, while not having high R-squared values, helps conduct 
cross-national comparisons in the developed countries by identifying factors significant in generating 
supplier trust towards their buyer. As a first step, this model has been applied to the Turkish case in 
this paper. This comparison is useful in comparing collectivistic cultures among each other in terms 
of trust. Face-to-face communication did not turn out to be a significant variable for any of the 
collectivistic cultures studied in this paper and Dyer and Chu.  The Mediterraneans, like the Japanese, 
are high context communicators, so relatively small amount of new information is required for 
effective communication and networking (Ring, 1997). Hence, the impact of face-to-face 
communication on trust may be somewhat diluted for collectivistic cultures.  
Sako and Helper (1998) had posited earlier that suppliers’ trust of customers would not be 
significantly affected by the degree to which they were vertically integrated by their buyer, and their 
data supported their hypothesis. Even though they had argued for a positive relationship between the 
buyer’s ownership of supplier stock and supplier’s trust towards the buyer, Dyer and Chu (2000) 
could not find support for this hypothesis in any of the three countries they studied. This relation also 
holds for the Turkish sample, further rei nforcing Sako and Helper’s findings and expanding 
generalizability on this issue. It should also be noted that stock ownership was not found to be 
common practice in the Turkish case, which is a different case compared to the earlier ones, as 
Turkey has a less developed and more turbulent economy. It may be the case for such economies that 
organizations act in an even more risk averse mode, given the uncertainties in the environment.  
From the results in Table 3, it seems clear that assistance is the key factor in all three 
collectivistic cultures studied in this paper. The strength of this variable suggested that it might be 
worthwhile to analyze it in further detail. Similarly a variable dealt with in the literature, i.e. 
switching costs, which was not included in the Dyer and Chu model, was added to the model.  
The extended model had better a R-squared value and more significant variables for the 
Turkish sample than the baseline model, indicating the need for enhanced measurement for certain  20
key concepts such as assistance. As in the baseline model, the extended model also shows assistance 
from the customer to be highly significant. According to this result, Turkish suppliers receiving 
technical and/or financial support from their main customers when they f ace problems feel trust 
towards their buyers. However, Turkish suppliers that have started their line of business with the 
support and guidance of their main customer feel distrust towards their customer. This finding, while 
contrary to our expectations, m ay be explained to some extent by considering the history of the 
relationship. It is interesting to note that while length of the relationship is significant in Japan, this 
factor did not turn out to be significant in the Turkish case. It would be expected  that during the 
history of the relationship, both buyers and suppliers would get to know each other’s work habits and 
tendencies, generating interorganizational trust. In Sako and Helper’s (1998) study, the length of past 
trading to date were associated w ith greater opportunism in the US. US automotive suppliers 
frequently experienced untrustworthy behavior from their customers in the past and this bias in 
expectations was carried forward to current practices (Sako and Helper, 1998). Similarly, the Turkish 
suppliers may feel locked into a relationship when it has been going on for a long time and when 
there is the indebtedness of initial support from the customers. 
The second variable added to the baseline model, namely switching, also turned out to be 
significant for the Turkish sample with all its operationalizations. Incidentally, Sako and Helper 
(1998) found this concept insignificant in the US and in Japan, both developed countries. As 
suggested by Burgess and Gules (1998) for the Turkish context, soft technologies such as the TQM, 
JIT, and related concepts are demanding in their implementation, requiring the strong support of 
suppliers. We also find that suppliers delivering their product Just-in-Time to their customers feel 
more trust toward their buyers, possibly because the tightly knit coordination required in JIT allows 
both parties to get to know each other’s work habits and share information. Also, as expected, the less 
threat the supplier feels from its main customer regarding switching to another supplier, the more 
trust it feels. This may be explained in terms of the uncertainty avoiding nature of the Turkish culture. 
The more security the supplier feels in the relationship, the more trust is generated, given the 
turbulent economical conditions of most developing countries. Contrary to our predictions, suppliers 
who deliver a greater portion of their customers’ requests feel less trust towards their customers. It 
would be expected that increasing its dependence on a particular supplier would help the customer 
gain the supplier’s trust. It may be the case that large sales may make small suppliers dependent on 







This study is an early contribution to the literature on trust between buyer-supplier relations 
in the context of developing countries. The study adds insight in several ways: 1) It tests an existing  21
theoretical model that applies to industrially developed countries (the US, Japan, and Korea) in the 
context of a developing country, namely Turkey. 2) it brings extensions to the original model that 
enhance explanatory power and hence provide suggestions for the measurement of certain broad 
concepts, 3) it tries to discuss similarities and differences across the Turkish and Japanese cultures, 
and 4) it adds to the comparative literature on the world automotive industry. 
Stock ownership is not a widespread phenomenon in Turkey, hence other trust-building 
activities need to be incorporated to signal trust from a buyer to its suppliers. Similarly, since almost 
all Turkish suppliers stated that they got repeated orders from their customers, the effect of 
expectations on continued repeated exchanges could not be fully captured for the Turkish case either. 
However, some important insights were gained through this study. First and foremost, it can be said 
that, like in other collectivistic cultures, financial and/or technical assistance from the customer is 
very important in generating trust towards the buyer for the Turkish sample. Unlike in Japan, the 
length of the relationship is not significant in Turkey, implying that the nature of the relationship, 
rather than its duration, is more important and should be measured separately. The fact that not all 
collectivistic cultures displayed the same results on other variables may also indicate that the level of 
development may be one of the contextual factors that needs to be considered in future research in the 
field of interorganizational relations.  
As a side issue, the fact that stock ownership turned out to be insignificant in all countries, 
developed or developing, examined so far in the literature warrants further investigation. Stock 
ownership is a more common practice in Japan, but Dyer and Chu’s results imply that it is other 
structural arrangements that might accompany stock ownership and not the portion of stock owned 
that generates trust in Japan. For other countries, stock ownership may even be interpreted as 
domination and may even cause distrust. Hence the relevance of this variable needs to be fully 
understood in future research. 
It can also be implied from the results that in uncertainty avoiding cultures, suppliers do not 
like to feel vulnerable towards their buyer. Any over-dependence on customer sales or  threat of 
switching from the buyer creates distrust in suppliers that are typically smaller and less powerful than 
their buyers. However, buyers can alleviate this distrust to an extent by collaborative purchasing 
strategies where more information is shared across organizations, such as JIT delivery. This may be a 
particularly useful strategy for high risk averse cultures. 
This study also showed the importance of utilizing multiple operationalizations of broad 
concepts such as help or switching costs. Additional facets of the same concept that can be captured 
with alternative operationalizations can provide further insights into complicated phenomena such as 
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APPENDIX 
General information about Turkish automotive manufacturers. Detailed information on two tractor manufacturers, 































































































Opel Turkiye*  Izmir  1990  GM Opel  100  Passenger car  25000  4297 





































Oyak-Renault  Bursa  1971  Renault  51  Passenger car  160000  125026 












Tofas  Bursa  1971  Fiat  37.8  Passenger car  250000  65510 
ToyotaSA  Sakarya   1994  Toyota  50  Passenger car  100000  9041 
Traksan  Kocaeli  1994  Universal  0  Farm tractor  N/A  0 
Turk Traktor  Ankara  1954  New Holland   37.5  Farm tractor  35000  11866 
Uzel  Istanbul  1962  Massey-Ferguson
/ 
Perkins 
0  Farm tractor  30000  11715 
Hyundai Assan  Kocaeli  1997  Hyundai Motor 
Co. 









Anadolu Honda  Kocaeli  1997  Honda  50  Passenger car  30000  6649 
* Recently closed down its manufacturing operations. 